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Vol. 91 No. 3

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Massachusetts Law Review

Bankruptcy and Mechanics’ Liens in Foreclosure

The basic dynamic of a mortgage and foreclosure is deceptively simple.  A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in land to a lender to secure repayment of a loan.  In the event of the mortgagor’s failure to repay the loan, the lender may foreclose on the real property.[1]  Like any other security interest, however, a mortgage is subject to competing claims and interests.  Among the potential hurdles to foreclosure are the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection, and the recording of mechanic’s liens on the property.[2]  This article provides an overview of the impact of bankruptcy on foreclosure, including the impact of select provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which became effective on October 17, 2005 (“BAPCPA”),[3] as well as a discussion of mechanic’s liens in Massachusetts as such liens affect, and are in turn affected by, mortgage foreclosures and bankruptcy proceedings.

I.          Impact of Bankruptcy on Foreclosure

A.        Bankruptcy Overview

Title 11 of the United States Code sets forth the federal statutory law known as the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).[4]  The Code allows both individual consumer debtors and business entities to restructure and resolve their debts through a court-supervised proceeding that may include an orderly distribution of the debtor’s assets to creditors.

The Code contemplates two basic types of bankruptcy proceedings:  liquidation and rehabilitation.[5]  In a chapter 7 liquidation, a trustee is appointed to investigate, collect and reduce to cash all of the debtor’s assets (with certain exceptions that are exempt from collection under applicable federal or state law).[6]  In contrast, chapters 11 and 13 allow a debtor to “reorganize” – that is, to restructure debt and be rehabilitated to continue operations pursuant to a plan approved by the bankruptcy court.  A business debtor may also choose to liquidate its assets in a chapter 11 case, generally without the involvement of a bankruptcy trustee but under the supervision of the bankruptcy court.  Under each chapter, available assets (if any) are distributed to creditors on a pro rata basis in accordance with a statutory priority scheme.

Consumer debtors may petition for bankruptcy protection under chapters 7, 11 or 13 of the Code, while business debtors are eligible to file under chapters 7 and 11.[7]  In a chapter 7 liquidation, unsecured creditors generally receive heavily discounted returns on their claims even when the trustee determines that the estate possesses nonexempt assets.  More often, a chapter 7 case will be declared a no-asset case, and the debtor will be discharged from all unsecured debts, without repayment.  Business and consumer debtors are also given an opportunity to reorganize under chapters 11 and 13 in order to maximize repayment to creditors.[8]  Chapter 13 allows the consumer debtor to retain essential property while repaying creditors over a period of three to five years, while offering a more generous discharge of debts than chapter 11.[9]  Consumers who file to resist imminent foreclosure generally choose chapter 13, which allows a debtor to cure arrearages and reinstate the mortgage, while paying a compromised amount to unsecured creditors.[10]  Most consumers elect to liquidate their assets under chapter 7, which allows the debtor to surrender his or her assets and discharge debts without undertaking a repayment plan.[11]

BAPCPA effected significant changes in the Code.  Many of these changes make it more difficult for a consumer debtor to discharge unsecured debts without completing a repayment program.  In addition to budget and credit counseling requirements,[12] a new “means test” assesses chapter 7 eligibility by comparing the debtor's income and reasonable expenses to the state median income – in Massachusetts, $52,633 for one earner and $91,892 for a family of four (for cases filed through March, 2008) – and budget guidelines.[13]  BAPCPA presumes abuse by chapter 7 debtors with income levels exceeding the state median income.[14]  If a debtor cannot rebut the presumption by showing “special circumstances,” such as a serious health problem, the case will be dismissed or converted to a case under chapter 11 or 13.  Debtors placed under chapter 13 must participate in a repayment plan that may be extended to as long as five years to maximize creditors’ recovery.[15] 

B.        Effects of Bankruptcy Filing:  Proofs of Claim and Arrearages

Every bankruptcy case begins with the filing of a petition, notice of which must be given to all creditors.[16]  A bankruptcy proceeding may either be filed voluntarily by a debtor or initiated by creditors against an involuntary debtor.[17]  The filing of a petition creates a bankruptcy estate, which is comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.[18]  To protect its interest in the estate – including the proper classification of its secured claim and the treatment of pre-petition arrearages – every creditor should timely file a proof of claim in the case or risk being forever barred, absent what the courts have termed “excusable neglect."[19]  The Code establishes the priority of each creditor’s interest in the estate,[20] which rarely will contain sufficient assets to pay all creditors’ claims in full.

C.        The Automatic Stay and Creation of the Bankruptcy Estate

The bankruptcy estate is subject to the protections of the “automatic stay,” a statutory injunction that arises automatically pursuant to section 362(a) of the Code.  Immediately upon a bankruptcy filing, creditors may not seek to collect debts or proceed against a debtor or its property in any way outside of the bankruptcy proceeding.[21]  Consequently, creditors must cease all attempts to collect mortgage loan arrearages and should not initiate foreclosure without filing a motion for relief from the automatic stay and obtaining a bankruptcy court order.[22]  Even if a valid foreclosure has taken place (either pre-petition or post-petition with bankruptcy court approval), the actual eviction of the debtor is regarded as a separate “proceeding against the debtor” that requires the party seeking eviction to obtain an order lifting the stay before proceeding.[23]  The automatic stay remains in place, absent a court order, until the property at issue is no longer property of the estate, or the case is closed, dismissed or the debtor is granted or denied a discharge.[24] 

Violations of the automatic stay may render a foreclosure void and subject the violator to tort damages and sanctions under the Code.[25]  For this reason, it is imperative that, before taking any action against the debtor or any act to obtain possession of, or exercise control over, property of the estate, the creditor first determine whether the stay applies, and if any uncertainty exists, how most effectively to obtain relief.[26]   Note, however, that a creditor or its counsel may engage in post-petition negotiations with the debtor to secure an agreement to reaffirm a debt[27] without violating an automatic stay, provided that the creditor does not engage in coercive or harassing tactics, including threatening foreclosure.[28]

The Code’s creation of an expansive bankruptcy estate and court-supervised division and distribution of that estate ultimately benefits creditors.  Upon a bankruptcy filing, all nonexempt assets become property of the bankruptcy estate[29] and the debtor loses the right to dispose of those assets[30] (except, in the case of business debtors, in the ordinary course of business).[31]  Likewise, a filing halts a “race to the courthouse” by creditors seeking to create and perfect liens against the debtor’s assets.[32]  Additionally, certain pre-petition transfers of property, secured interests, and liens claimed by particular creditors may be delayed or invalidated for the benefit of the creditor body as a whole.[33]  Even property in which the debtor no longer has a possessory interest may be deemed part of the bankruptcy estate.[34]           

In view of the current subprime mortgage crisis, the courts are becoming increasingly protective of debtors, particularly with regard to enforcing the protections afforded by the automatic stay.[35]  Thus, it is more important than ever that creditors seeking to enforce their rights ensure that they have timely and precisely complied with all legal requirements before seeking relief from the courts.

D.        Creditors Beware: Turnover, Setoff and Lien Avoidance

Pursuant to section 542(a) of the Code, a court may order any creditor to turn over repossessed or seized property to the bankruptcy trustee when the debtor’s redemption rights have not been fully extinguished.[36]  The expansive definition of “property of the estate”[37] and the protection to the estate afforded by the automatic stay is so extensive that, even after a mortgage foreclosure, the property may be drawn back into the estate if the sale has not been fully consummated under state law.  Pursuant to the Massachusetts Statute of Frauds,[38] a debtor retains redemption rights in mortgaged property until a memorandum of sale is mutually executed.[39]  Execution of the memorandum of sale – not the foreclosure auction itself – extinguishes the debtor’s (and, therefore, the estate’s) rights in the property.[40]  A debtor whose redemption rights have been extinguished may only avoid foreclosure, or recover damages thereafter, by convincing the bankruptcy court that substantial defects in the foreclosure process rendered it invalid.[41]  In re Strayton,[42] a decision by the Massachusetts bankruptcy court, has arguably heightened the standard for diligence and good faith required of a foreclosing mortgagee.[43]

Secured creditors enjoy special protection under the Code.  Even when property seized prior to the filing of a petition must be turned over to the bankruptcy trustee, a secured creditor’s interest in the property remains intact.[44]  Further, under section 363 of the Code, the secured creditor is entitled to “adequate protection” of its interests.[45]  The purpose of section 542(a) is essentially procedural:  to require secured creditors to protect their interests utilizing bankruptcy procedures, as by filing a motion to lift stay or an objection to the debtor’s proposed plan of reorganization, rather than withholding property of the estate that may be used for the collective benefit of all creditors and to rehabilitate the debtor.

As federal law, the Code preempts state law.  Accordingly, states may not regulate bankruptcy.[46]  Nonetheless, substantive state and federal (nonbankruptcy) law governs other aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship that are relevant to foreclosure and mortgages.  These laws include debt collection statutes, fraudulent transfer statutes, and laws regulating lending to protect consumers.[47]  Creditors should be particularly aware of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,[48] the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act,[49] and the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act,[50] which is based on the Federal Truth in Lending Act[51] and the Consumer Credit Protection Act,[52] and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.[53]  Given the Code’s preemption of state law, creditors should further be aware that their rights, however well established under state law, are subject to modification under the Code.[54]

By way of illustration, under state law, and subject to the nature and terms of the agreements providing for a deposit account and loan respectively, a lending institution may generally exercise a right of setoff when a delinquent loan customer has otherwise deposited funds with the bank.  In the event that a customer files bankruptcy, however, under certain circumstances, the trustee may lawfully recover from the bank the amount of the setoff.  Section 553(b) of the Code subjects pre-petition setoffs to an empirical “insufficiency” test to ascertain the extent to which the creditor may have improved its position by effecting the setoff, which in turn will determine the amounts (if any) that the trustee may recover.[55] 

In some instances, a creditor’s rights may be modified even to the extent of avoidance of a lien.[56]  For example, section 522(f) of the Code allows for avoidance of a “judicial lien” on the debtor's interest in real property to the extent the lien impairs an exemption.[57] A judicial lien is defined as a “lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding”.[58] The term ordinarily does not include a consensual lien such as a mortgage, but the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that a deficiency judgment obtained upon foreclosure of the mortgage – unlike the mortgage itself – is a nonconsensual lien like any other and is therefore subject to avoidance under section 522(f). [59]

In other instances, bankruptcy courts may allow a debtor to “strip off” a seemingly valid lien (typically that of a wholly undersecured junior lienholder) “if there is no security available to the lienholder to foreclose on in the event the debtor fails to fulfill the contract payment obligations”[60] – i.e., where the collateral has no value.  Similarly, an undersecured creditor’s lien may be “stripped down” to the value of the collateral.[61]

E.         BAPCPA 2005: Select Provisions Affecting Mortgages and Foreclosure           

Significant changes to the prerequisites for obtaining the protection of the automatic stay have already affected the interplay between foreclosure and bankruptcy.  In summary, as noted above, would-be individual debtors are now subject to means testing pursuant to section 707(b) of the Code and are required to have completed budget and credit counseling as recently as within the “180 days” preceding a filing for bankruptcy protection.[62]  Moreover, the availability of the automatic stay has been severely curtailed with regard to repeat bankruptcy filers,[63] signifying the end of the cycle of foreclosure attempts and bankruptcy filings sometimes commenced under the prior Code.  BAPCPA also expanded the Code definition of a “single asset real estate debtor,”[64] making it more difficult for such debtors to retain the protections of the automatic stay.  Finally, under BAPCPA it is clear that a consumer debtor wishing to retain personal property in which a lender holds a security interest must reaffirm or redeem the debt (thus eliminating the so-called “ride through” option), but it is arguable that real property may now ride through the bankruptcy without a reaffirmation agreement or redemption.[65]

The new budget and credit counseling requirement imposed by section 109(h)(1) of the Code provides that an individual may not be a debtor in a bankruptcy case

unless such individual has, during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency … an individual or group briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Internet) that outlined the opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related budget analysis.[66] 

The requirement is being strictly construed by bankruptcy courts, which have denied relief where the requirement has not been met.[67]  The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and provides only limited enumerated exceptions to the requirement that an individual obtain counseling before filing a petition.[68]  Pursuant to section 521(b) of the Code, the debtor must then file with the court “a certificate from the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency describing the services provided to the debtor”[69] and also file a copy of any resultant repayment plan.[70]

These new requirements will invariably curtail the heretofore common practice of filing bankruptcy at eleventh hour to prevent imminent foreclosure.  Bankruptcy courts have yet to reach a consensus as to whether the appropriate response to a bankruptcy filing by an ineligible debtor is to strike the petition, rendering it void ab initio, or to dismiss the petition.[71]  The distinction is legally significant because if the bankruptcy petition is struck, it will be as though the automatic stay never existed, and a foreclosure conducted post-petition will remain valid.  Conversely, if the petition is dismissed, a foreclosure conducted post-petition, but prior to dismissal, would be in violation of the automatic stay.  Where a bankruptcy is dismissed and successfully reinstated, First Circuit case law suggests that the reinstatement of the case will not act to invalidate a foreclosure sale conducted post-dismissal but before refiling.[72]

BAPCPA also added several sections to section 362 that pertain to the availability of the stay for repeat filers.  First, new section 362(c)(3) provides that if a debtor has had even one prior bankruptcy case dismissed within one year before the current filing, the stay terminates after 30 days, absent a court order granting an extension.[73]  There has been some confusion among bankruptcy courts as to whether new section 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay with regard to the debtor, property of the debtor and property of the estate, or only with regard to the debtor and property of the debtor.[74]  The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit has concluded that the automatic stay does not terminate with respect to property of the estate.[75]

Second, new section 362(c)(4) states that if a debtor has been the subject of two or more prior cases dismissed within the prior year, no automatic stay goes into effect upon the filing.[76]  Under section 362(c)(4), the debtor must petition the court to put the stay into effect.  The stay will be effectuated or extended only if the new filing is in good faith as to the creditors that will be subject to the stay.[77]  A lack of good faith is presumed under the following circumstances,  and may only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the debtor had more than one bankruptcy case already pending within the preceding year; (2) a previous case was dismissed after the debtor's failure to (a) file or amend the petition or other documents required by the Code or the court without substantial excuse, (b) provide court-ordered adequate protection, or (c) perform the terms of a confirmed plan; or (3) there has been no substantial change in the debtor's financial or personal affairs since the last dismissal or any other reason to conclude that the current case will result in a chapter 7 discharge or a confirmed and fully performed chapter 11 or 13 plan.[78]  In addition, there is a presumptive lack of good faith as to a particular creditor who had obtained stay relief or had a stay relief motion pending as of the dismissal of a prior case.[79]

Finally, new section 362(d)(4) provides that, upon finding that a bankruptcy filing “was part of a scheme to delay, hinder, and defraud creditors” that involved either “(1) the transfer of all or part ownership (or other interest) in the real property without court approval or the consent of the secured creditor or (2) multiple bankruptcy filings affecting such property,”[80] the court shall lift the automatic stay as to a secured creditor proceeding against such property in satisfaction of its valid lien.[81]  If such an order is “recorded in compliance with applicable state laws governing notices of interests or liens in real property,”[82] it will be binding in any other bankruptcy case, filed within two years, that affects that real property.[83]  The debtor may, however, in a subsequent case, move for relief based upon changed circumstances or for other good cause shown.[84]           

A more subtle change to the Code affects the “single asset real estate debtor.”  In a single asset real estate bankruptcy, a debtor must file a feasible plan of reorganization or commence monthly interest payments in order to maintain the protections of the automatic stay.  Pre-BAPCPA, a single asset case was defined as one in which the following four factors existed: (i) a single real property or project (excluding residential property with fewer than four units) (ii) that generates substantially all of the debtor’s income (iii) on which the debtor conducts no substantial business other than operation of the property and (iv) on which there is no more than $4 million in secured debt.[85]  BAPCPA has amended this definition to exclude the fourth requirement of a $4 million cap on secured debt.[86]  Consequently, filing a plan or making monthly payments to secured creditors is now essentially mandatory for all single asset real estate debtors that desire to maintain the automatic stay. 

Another relevant BAPCPA development is actually based on the complete silence of the Code as to any restrictions on the “ride-through” of real property.  This omission stands in stark contrast to the substantial new restrictions on the ride-through protection available for personal property.  Pre-BAPCPA, several courts of appeals held that the Code permitted debtors to retain certain personal property without being required to reaffirm or redeem the debt as long the debtor stayed current on payments.  Hence, the property was said to “ride through” the bankruptcy.[87]  These courts, however, were split as to whether the debtor enjoyed the same privilege with regard to real property.  Following BAPCPA, sections 362(h) and 521(a)(6) of the Code now prohibit ride through – but only as to personal property collateral.[88]  Since a common rule of statutory construction presumes the legislature to be aware of such divisions, the enactment of legislation prohibiting ride through only as to personal property may be construed to mean that Congress intended that real property may ride through.[89] 

II.        Interplay of Massachusetts Mechanic’s Liens, Mortgage Foreclosures and       Bankruptcy Proceedings 

A.        Overview of Mechanic’s Liens in Massachusetts

In Massachusetts, mechanic’s liens are created and governed purely by statute.[90]  The governing statute, General Laws chapter 254, provides, in pertinent part:

A person entering into a written contract with the owner of any interest in real property, or with any person acting for, on behalf of, or with the consent of such owner for the whole or part of the erection, alteration, repair or removal of a building, structure, or other improvement to real property, or for furnishing material or rental equipment, appliances, or tools therefore, shall have a lien upon such real property, land, building, structure or improvement owned by the party with whom or on behalf of whom the contract was entered into, as appears of record on the date when notice of said contract is filed or recorded in the registry of deeds for the county or district where such land lies, to secure the payment of all labor, including construction management and general contractor services, and material or rental equipment, appliances, or tools which shall be furnished by virtue of said contract.[91]

“The primary purpose of the lien is to provide security to contractors, subcontractors, laborers, and suppliers for the value of their services and goods provided for the owner’s real estate.”[92]  “Because a mechanic’s lien is purely a creation of statute, the courts have consistently required exact compliance with the statute in order to create, perfect, and enforce such a lien.”[93] 

B.        Notice of Contract 

A contractor seeking to obtain a lien must record a “notice of contract” in the registry of deeds for the county in which the property is located.[94]  The statute calculates a deadline for the recording of a notice of contract based upon whether (and how) the contract is either terminated or completed.  If the owner and contractor have filed a notice of substantial completion under  section 2A (indicating that “work under the written contract is sufficiently complete so that it can be occupied or utilized for its intended use”)[95], the notice of contract must be filed no later than 60 days after the notice of substantial completion was filed.[96]  If the owner has filed a notice of termination under section 2B, the notice of contract must be filed no later than 90 days after the notice of termination was filed.[97]  Absent a notice of substantial completion or notice of termination, the notice of contract must be filed no later than 90 days after the contractor “last performed or furnished labor or materials or both labor and materials.”[98]  A notice of contract may be recorded “at any time after the execution of the written contract,” as long as it is recorded before the applicable deadline.[99]  A subcontractor or supplier seeking to obtain a lien must also give actual notice to the owner of such filing.[100]

C.        Statement of Account 

Enforcement of the lien requires further steps.  Pursuant to General Laws chapter 254, section 8, the contractor must record a statement of account, setting forth the amount due or to become due.[101]  It must be recorded within 90 days of the filing of a notice of substantial completion; 120 days of the filing of a notice of termination; or 120 days after the contractor last performed or furnished labor, materials, equipment, appliances, or tools for the project, whichever is earliest.[102]  Failure to file a statement of account within these time frames results in dissolution of the lien.[103] 

D.        Commencing and Recording an Action 

After filing the statement of account, the contractor has a brief period of time in which to enforce the lien.  Within 90 days of recording the statement of account, the contractor must file a civil action in the superior court for the county in which the real property is located [104] and, within 30 days of filing suit, must record in the registry of deeds an attested copy of the complaint, which should contain a brief description of the property sufficient to identify it and a statement of the amount due.[105]  If either deadline is not met, the lien will be dissolved.[106]

In filing an action, the plaintiff-contractor (or subcontractor) will name, as defendants, the owner and any higher-tier contractor.  As with any civil litigation, the defendants may raise defenses to the action[107] or bring an action to dissolve the lien.[108] 

E.         Dissolution of Liens 

Once perfected, a lien may be dissolved in several ways.  A contractor may voluntarily dissolve its lien by notice pursuant to General Laws chapter 254, section 10.[109]  The court will also enter a judgment dissolving a lien if it appears that no person is entitled to a lien, or that every lien has been discharged by payment.[110]  Such a judgment has the effect of dissolving the lien.

The recording of a bond under General Laws chapter 254, section 14 will also result in dissolution of the lien.  Under that section, any person in interest may dissolve a lien by recording the bond in the registry of deeds.[111]  The bond must be issued by a surety company authorized to do business in Massachusetts for a sum equal to the amount of the lien sought to be dissolved.[112]  Notice of the recording must be given by serving the claimant with copies of the bond and notice of bond.[113]  Service must be made by an officer authorized to serve process or by delivering the notice and copy of the bond to the claimant.[114]  The claimant may enforce the bond by commencing a civil action within 90 days after filing a statement of account or receipt of the notice of bond recording, whichever is later.[115]  The bond gives the claimant no greater rights than it would have had, or impair any defense that the obligors would have had, in an action to enforce a lien.[116]

Finally, General Laws chapter 254, section 15A establishes a summary process whereby an owner may seek a discharge of a defective mechanic’s lien or notice by filing a separate action, generally in the superior court for the county in which the real property is located.  There is some doubt, however, as to whether a contractor’s appeal of a judgment dissolving the lien will effectively resurrect the lien as a cloud on the title during the pendency of the appeal.[117] 

F.         Lien Priority 

A successful final judgment establishing the lien provides a basis for the lienholder to seek recovery through a court-ordered sale of the property (similar to an execution sale).[118]  The debtor retains redemption rights for 90 days after the sale.[119] The cost of redemption may include costs associated with establishing the lien.[120]

Upon such sale, or upon foreclosure, the recording of the notice of the contract establishes the priority of the mechanic’s lien.  As a general matter, the lien takes priority over all later-recorded encumbrances on the property, but if there is more than one lien creditor, each will receive a pro rata distribution regardless of the date upon which the lien creditor filed a notice of contract.[121]  Hence, ordinarily, a duly recorded prior mortgage will trump subsequent mechanic’s liens.  Massachusetts law generally prohibits any agreement, in connection with (or collateral to) contracts related to improvement to real property that bar filing a notice of contract, taking steps to enforce a lien, or purporting to subordinate such rights to the rights of other persons.[122]  There are, however, important exceptions.  For example, a so-called “section one” lien for labor will subrogate a mortgage that was recorded before the sworn statement for the labor, if the labor protected by the lien began before the mortgage was recorded.[123]  Another  exception to this general rule of lien priority is the so-called “rolling lien” provided by General Laws chapter 254, section 32(4), which creates a procedure for partial waivers and subordination of lien rights in exchange for advances by secured lenders.[124] 

G.        Mechanic’s Liens in Bankruptcy

A question that frequently arises with respect to mechanic’s liens in bankruptcy is whether steps may be taken to perfect the lien after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy relief.  As discussed above,[125] section 362 of the Code generally enjoins any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate.  Sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b) of the Code, taken together, set forth an exception from the stay for acts to continue perfection of certain interests in property.  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explained the operation of these provisions in a decision dealing with environmental “superliens,” as follows:

[T]he automatic stay [is] inapplicable to “any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property to the extent that the [bankruptcy] trustee’s rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of [the Bankruptcy Code]...[which] limits the debtor’s powers to avoid statutory liens by providing that they are “subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights before the date of perfection.” Thus sections 362(b)(3) and 546(b)(1)(A), read together, plot the boundaries of the exception to the automatic stay….[126]

General Laws chapter 254 is “generally applicable law” that authorizes a contractor to perfect a lien that has retroactive effect, and thus falls within the purview of the section 546(b) exception to the automatic stay. [127]  More particularly, chapter 254 (like General Laws chapter  21E, the environmental superlien statute reviewed by the First Circuit) authorizes both the creation and perfection of a lien through the single act of a recording with the registry of deeds.[128]  Consequently, if a contractor has recorded a pre-petition notice of contract, it is generally believed that the Code allows for a continuation of the perfection.[129] 

A contractor that recorded a pre-petition notice of contract is well advised, however, to move for relief from the stay before taking any action to maintain or continue perfection of its lien.  Indeed, from a contractor’s standpoint, the best practice is to protect its lien in two ways:  first, by filing with the bankruptcy court and serving on all creditors and parties in interest a notice of perfection of mechanic’s lien pursuant to section 546(b) of the Code, with statement of account and other relevant documentation attached, and, second, petitioning the court for relief from stay, if and to the extent that such relief is needed, in order to take the further steps required to maintain and continue perfection pursuant to General Laws chapter 254.[130] 

Conclusion

Counsel to both creditors and debtors in Massachusetts are well-advised to pay close attention to the intricacies of various state and federal laws that affect mortgage foreclosures.  These include, but are not limited to, General Laws chapter 254 and the United States Bankruptcy Code.[131]  Secured creditors have generally benefited from recent changes in the Code discussed herein, such as the “means test,” budget and credit counseling requirements and new provisions curtailing the availability of the automatic stay to repeat filers.  These changes are likely to reduce the number of last-minute bankruptcy filings designed to stave off impending foreclosure.  Nonetheless, the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Tremont Tower – concluding that the right to file a mechanic’s lien may be resurrected after the lien is once dissolved – serves as a reminder that a foreclosing mortgagee must pay scrupulous attention to statutes designed to protect various constituencies.[132]  These constituencies include not only the debtor-mortgagor, but also contractors, subcontractors and materialmen who have provided labor and materials to improve the mortgaged property.  Where – as here – complex statutes intersect, there is little room left for the generalist.



[1]  The Massachusetts statute does not define “foreclosure.”  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as an action “to shut out, to bar, to destroy an equity of redemption.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 646 (6th ed. 1990).  See also Levin v. Century Indem. Co., 279 Mass. 256, 259 (1932) (“The foreclosure of a mortgage…means a termination of all rights of the mortgagor or his grantee in the property covered by the mortgage.”).

[2]  In Massachusetts, mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens are governed by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, §§ 1-33 (2006).  Unless otherwise indicated, we use the term “mechanic’s liens” to refer to liens filed by contractors, subcontractors or material suppliers.

[3]  Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).

[4]  11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006) (amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005)).

[5]  Eligibility to file for bankruptcy protection is governed by § 109 of the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).

[6]  Under Massachusetts law, debtors may protect from their creditors an estate of homestead as well as certain personal property.  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 188, §§ 1-10 (2006) (homestead) and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 235, § 34 (2006) (property exempt from execution). In Massachusetts, an exempt homestead is a principal residence that has a value not exceeding $500,000.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch.188 § 1 (2006).  Alternatively, debtors may elect to exercise exemption rights under the Code.  11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (2006).  Massachusetts debtors may opt to exercise either the state or the federal exemptions, but not both. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (a)(2) (2006) (“Property listed in this paragraph [as exempt] is property that is specified under subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under paragraph 3(A) specifically does not so authorize.”) As a practical matter, the Massachusetts exemption is more favorable to debtors than the federal exemption and will invariably be selected.  However, pursuant to BAPCPA, if a debtor owns the homestead for less than 40 months, amended Section 522 imposes a $125,000 homestead cap that overrides any higher state homestead exemption cap. See In re Virissimo, Nos. BK-S-13605-LBR, BK-S-05-15667-LB R, 2005 WL 2854341, at *6 (Bankr. D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2005) (“Congress wanted to close what it perceived was the abuse of exemptions caused, in part, by the varying state laws and overly generous homesteads.”)

[7]  Business entities are not eligible to file for relief under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2006).  The Code includes several other operating chapters that are not typically used to prevent foreclosure and hence are not generally discussed in these materials: 9 (which provides a reorganization alternative for municipalities); 12 (which extends bankruptcy relief to family farmers); and 15 (newly created to apply to certain cross-border and ancillary cases).  See id. §§ 901-46, 1201-31, 1501-31.

[8]  See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 326 (1993) (debtors filing under Chapter 13 have right to set up a repayment plan for their mortgage, but Court denied debtors’ attempt to bifurcate mortgagee’s claim into a secured claim for one amount, and a worthless unsecured claim for the remainder); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991) (individual debtor without “an ongoing business” may nevertheless utilize chapter 11).

[9]  See 11 U.S.C. §§  1306(b), 1322(d), 1328 (2006).

[10]  See id. §§ 1322(b)(3), 1322(c), 1322(b)(1).

[11]  See id. § 727.

[12]  Id. § 109(h)(1).

[13]  Id. § 707(b).  See also In re Moates, 338 B.R. 716, 717 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2006) (noting that individual debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts may not be subject to means testing); Massachusetts median income information, available athttp://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20080201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm

[14]  11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006).

[15] Prior to the enactment of BAPCPA, the Code required only a three-year repayment plan, subject to extension “for cause.”  11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000) (amended 2005).

[16]  See 11 U.S.C.  §§ 301(a), 302(a), 303(b) 342 (2006).

[17]  Id. §§ 301, 303.

[18]  Id. § 541(a)(1).

[19]  The Supreme Court has held that the concept of “excusable neglect,” within the meaning of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1), permits the courts to accept late filings caused by “inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness,” but the standard for obtaining such relief is stringent and seldom satisfied.  See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 383 (1993).

[20]  11 U.S.C. § 507 (2006).

[21]  The Code creates an automatic stay upon filing, but also establishes exceptions from the stay for certain interests judged by the legislature to be deserving of special protection from a public policy perspective.  11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).  For example, the Code does not stay criminal actions against the debtor, civil actions with respect to child custody and visitation, dissolution of marriage (except to the extent that such proceeding seeks to determine the division of property of the estate), or exercises of the state’s police power such as suspension of driving or professional licenses or exclusion from Medicare, among others.  See id. § 362(b).  Two of these exceptions may be relevant in the context of a foreclosure.  One such exception is for actions by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust formerly insured under the National Housing Act that covers property consisting of five or more living units.  Id. § 362(b)(8).  The second is significant in the context of mechanic’s liens, discussed infra Part II.G.  See id. § 362(b)(3) (acts to perfect, or to maintain or continue perfection, of an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s rights and powers are subject to perfection under id. § 546(b).

[22] Section 362(d) of the Code provides relief from the automatic stay “such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay…for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest” if the debtor does not have equity in the property and it is not necessary to effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006); In re Mellino, 333 B.R. 578, 583-84 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (automatic stay did not apply because debtor had no interest in the foreclosed property).

[23]  In re Crichlow, 334 B.R. 321 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (highest bidder’s successful motion to lift stay for purpose of eviction pursuant to foreclosure upheld; debtor’s motion to stay eviction denied where debtor lacked likelihood of success on appeal, and purchaser was likely to suffer irreparable harm if eviction were delayed); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, §§ 1-13 (2006) (Massachusetts summary process statutes) and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., Court Rules, Trial Court Rules § I.  (Thomson/West 2006) (Massachusetts Uniform Summary Process Rules).

[24]  11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2006).

[25]  See id. § 362(h); see also In re Kane, 248 B.R. 216 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000), aff’d, 254 F.3d 325 (1st Cir. 2001) (post-petition notice of automatic foreclosure of tax lien violated the stay and was rendered void); In re Weber, 283 B.R. 630 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (reopens case to void foreclosure of debtor’s right of redemption in real property that was obtained by means of state court proceedings in violation of the automatic stay; hearing on 362(h) sanctions to follow). But cf. In re Heron Pond, L.L.C., 258 B.R. 529 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (a single continuation of foreclosure sale is neither commencement nor continuation of action or proceeding against debtor if, before continued sale date, creditor obtains appropriate order granting relief from stay; in all other instances of continued sales, cases will be treated individually).

[26]  Given the scope of the automatic stay, the difficulty in interpreting the limits of its reach, and the substantial risk incurred by a creditor who fails to comply, the safe course is to consult with experienced bankruptcy counsel when such an issue arises.

[27]  Reaffirmation reflects an agreement between the debtor and the creditor, whereby the creditor can proceed to enforce its rights as if bankruptcy had not intervened. A reaffirmation agreement must (1) be executed before general discharge has been granted in the bankruptcy, (2) be in consideration for dischargeable debt, whether or not debtor waived discharge of debt, (3) include clear and conspicuous statements that debtor may rescind reaffirmation agreement at any time prior to granting of general discharge, or within 60 days after execution of agreement, whichever occurs later, and that reaffirmation is neither required by the Code nor by nonbankruptcy law; (4) be filed with bankruptcy court; and (5) be accompanied by affidavit of debtor's attorney attesting that debtor was fully advised of legal consequences of agreement, that debtor executed agreement knowingly and voluntarily, and that agreement would not cause the debtor undue hardship.  11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006).

[28]  See Jamo v. Katahdin Fed. Credit Union (In re Jamo), 283 F.3d 392, 400-01, 402 (1st Cir. 2002) (creditor's decision to withhold reaffirmation of secured debt unless debtor agrees to reaffirm other, unsecured debts is not per se violation of automatic stay; however, threats of foreclosure or repossession, as distinguished from benign references made to foreclosure during reaffirmation negotiations, would have constituted violation of automatic stay).

[29]  See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).

[30]  Id. § 542(a).

[31]  Id. §§ 1107, 1304.

[32]  See id. § 362(a).

[33]  See id. §§ 544, 545, 547, 548, 553(b), 724(a), 749(a). 

[34]  United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 209 (1983) (bankruptcy estate includes property of debtor that had been seized by IRS prior to filing of bankruptcy petition).

[35]  See In re Soderman, Nos. 07-41651-JBR, 07-42284-JBR, 2008 WL 397706, at *1 (Bankr. D. Mass.) (continuations of foreclosure sales during pendency of bankruptcy case violate automatic stay when “the sale [is] postponed in order to harass the debtor, gain advantage for the creditor, or revive the financial pressures that drove the debtor into bankruptcy”); In re Maisel, 379 B.R. 19, 20-1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (court takes seriously responsibility to ensure debtors “receive the full protection of the Bankruptcy Code, including the benefit of an automatic stay,” by ensuring lenders’ compliance with all requirements of the Bankruptcy Code); In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (court dismissed foreclosure cases where lenders failed to produce assignments showing lenders as holders and owners of notes and mortgages as of date of filing of complaint). 

[36]  Turnover is not required in three situations: when (i) the property is of inconsequential value or benefit to the estate; (ii) without notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy, the holder of the property transferred it in good faith to an entity other than the trustee; or (iii) transfer of the property is required to be made automatically to a life insurance company to pay a premium or carry out a nonforfeiture insurance option.  11 U.S.C. § 542(a), (c)-(d) (2006).

[37]  See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).

[38]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. c.259, § 1 (2006).

[39]  See id.

[40]  “[F]all of the hammer at the auction signifies the acceptance of the bid and an agreement between the parties, but will not alone terminate a debtor’s equity of redemption [in mortgaged property] under the Statute.”  In re Grassie, 293 B.R. 829, 831 n.2 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2003) (where purchaser had not signed sale document on foreclosed property at time debtor/seller filed petition, sale memorandum did not extinguish debtor’s equity of redemption, and property became property of estate, subject to automatic stay); see also In re Mellino, 333 B.R. at 578 (redemption right expired pre-petition with execution of memorandum of sale; hence, debtor had no legal interest in foreclosed property as of commencement of case and automatic stay did not apply). In re Dow, 250 B.R. 6, 7-8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (where creditor foreclosed a few minutes before debtor filed, and thereafter signed memorandum of sale, but never delivered foreclosure deed, debtor retained its equity of redemption under Massachusetts law and memorandum of sale was void as violation of automatic stay) (following Williams v. Resolution GGF Oy, 417 Mass. 377, 383-84 (1994) (until memorandum of sale was executed, debtor retained redemption rights and there was no sale; reasoning that sale, not auction, extinguishes redemption rights)).

[41] A mortgagor may seek to void a foreclosure sale on the basis of procedural defects; but defects that are technical in nature may not require that a sale be voided.  See Farm Credit Bank v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2003) (denying mortgagor’s motion for relief under rule 60(b)(4) from order confirming sale of real property where motion was not filed within reasonable time and alleged defects in mortgage foreclosure proceeding were technical in nature).  A foreclosing creditor may also lose its right to a deficiency claim if it fails to use good faith and reasonable diligence in conducting the foreclosure sale.  In re LaPointe, 253 B.R. 496, 499-501 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (finding that creditor failed to use good faith and reasonable diligence in conducting foreclosure sale without public notice and remanding with direction to reduce damages award to amount not to exceed difference between fair market value of property at time of foreclosure, and foreclosure sale price; because mortgagee did not engage in any marketing, obtain an appraisal, contact a real estate broker, inquire into the market regarding either value or prospective buyers, inspect the property, or publish sufficient newspaper notice); compare BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 545 (1994) (foreclosure sale could not be avoided where price received at mortgage foreclosure sale conclusively established “reasonably equivalent value” of mortgage property, as long as requirements of state’s foreclosure law were met).

[42]  Strayton v. Champion Mortg. (In re Strayton), 360 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007).

[43]  Id. (concluding that mortgagee failed to act in good faith and use reasonable diligence in conducting foreclosure sale because mortgagee did not engage in marketing, obtain an appraisal, contact real estate broker, inquire into market regarding either value or prospective buyers, inspect the property, or publish sufficient newspaper notice).

[44] See Pileckas v. Marcucio, 156 B.R. 721, 725 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (“It is well settled that before a secured creditor may be compelled to turnover property under the Code, the debtor must demonstrate that the secured creditor’s interest is ‘adequately protected.”) (emphasis in original).

[45]  “Adequate protection” may consist of cash payments, additional or replacement liens, or other relief “as will result in the realization … of the indubitable equivalent of such entity’s interest in such property”.  11 U.S.C. § 361 (2006).

[46]  See Kalb v. Feuerstein 308 U.S. 433, 439 (1940) (“The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to regulate bankruptcy.”).

[47]  See Hart v. GMAC Mortgage Corp. (In re Hart), 246 B.R. 709 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (holder of mortgage note and its servicing agent alleged to have violated automatic stay, Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and Federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Lender found liable under FDCPA, but not TILA, for unfair debt collection and trade practices for continuing foreclosure after misapplication of payments due to inadequacies in computer systems and in communications among creditor’s business divisions.).

[48]  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006).

[49]  Mass. Gen. Laws c. 93A, §§ 1-11 (2006).

[50]  Id. c. 140D, §§ 1-34.

[51]  15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (2006).  The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) was first enacted in 1968 as Title 1 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (PL 90-321, 82 Stat. 146), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006).

[52]  Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified, as amended, in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2006)).

[53]  50 U.S.C. app. § 501-596 (2006) formerly titled the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940.  See also Pamela Smith Holleman, Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, paper presented at the Bankruptcy Court Practice 2004-14th Annual Bankruptcy Court Meets Bar Conference (available upon request from the author at [e-mail pholleman]).

[54]  Attorneys should also take note of 940 CMR 25.02(b), which has been described as “a new regulation designed to protect property owners from corrupt foreclosure rescue schemes.”  David E. Frank, Lawyers: Unclear Foreclosure Regs Forcing Them to Turn Down Business, Mass. Lawyer’s Weekly, January 28, 2008 at 1 (discussing competing interpretations of the regulation).  The regulation provides, with certain exceptions, that

[i]t is an unfair or deceptive act in violation of G.L.M. c.93A, § 2(a) to, for compensation or gain or for potential or contingent compensation or gain … engage in, arrange, offer, promote, promise, solicit participation in, or carry out a Foreclosure Rescue Transaction in the Commonwealth or concerning residential property in the Commonwealth. 

By its terms, the regulation does not prohibit a licensed attorney from soliciting or accepting an advance fee or retainer for legal services in connection with the preparation and filing of a bankruptcy petition or court proceedings, or to avoid a foreclosure.  Concern has been expressed, however, that the regulation may prevent lawyers from accepting advance fees or retainers to represent clients in need of foreclosure-related services, such as negotiating a loan modification with a mortgage lender on behalf of a consumer borrower.  If so, lenders’ counsel may find themselves increasingly dealing with unrepresented debtors in such situations.  See id. (discussing competing interpretations of the regulation).

[55]  The section 553(b) test commences by taking a snapshot of whichever day is later: the 90th day preceding the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy or the first day during the 90 days pre-petition in which the debtor’s deposit with the lender is less than the debtor’s outstanding note (“Day X”).  The amount by which the debtor’s deposit with the lender is less than her outstanding note is termed the “insufficiency.”  After determining the insufficiency on Day X, the test requires determining the insufficiency, if any, on the actual day of the setoff (“Day Y”). If the insufficiency existing on Day X exceeds any insufficiency on Day Y, the lender is deemed to have impermissibly “improved its position.”  The trustee is then authorized to recover the difference between the two insufficiencies, up to, but no more than, the amount set off.  Notably, section 553(b) does not apply to setoffs taken under certain types of contracts, such as commodities contracts, forward contracts, and certain executory contracts given particular treatment under the Code.  See 11 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), 362(b)(6), 365(h), 365(i)(2), 546(h) (2006).

[56]  See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2007) (where a failure to avoid the mortgage would give lender a mortgage lien, which was more than it would receive as a general creditor, new mortgage granted to new lender was avoided as preferential).

[57]  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) (2006).

[58]  See id. § 101(36).

[59]  See In re Hart, 328 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2003) (bank obtained deficiency judgment in connection with foreclosure; reasoning that § 522(f)(2)(C) is not an exception to otherwise avoidable liens, but merely clarifies that judgments authorizing foreclosure are not judicial liens subject to § 522(f)).

[60]  Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000) (wholly unsecured second mortgage may be stripped off - the lien voided - under Chapter 13 plan, leaving creditor with wholly unsecured claim; reasoning that creditor would have gotten nothing in a foreclosure sale, and bankruptcy should confer no greater rights upon creditors than available outside bankruptcy).

[61]  See id.

[62]  11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006).  Section 109(h)(1) refers to the requirement as a “briefing” to be received from an “approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency,” but § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) refers to “credit counseling services.”

[63]  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2006) with 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (2000) (amended 2005).

[64]  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2006) with 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2000) (amended 2005).

[65]  11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2006); In re Wilson, 372 B.R. 816 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (allowing chapter 7 debtor to retain real property, without reaffirmation or redemption, so long as debtor remained current on payments to secured creditor and complied with all other contractual obligations; concluding that BAPCPA did not eliminate such “ride through” option with respect to real property).

[66]  11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(1) (2006).

[67]  E.g. In re Hubbard, 332 B.R. 285, 288 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The Court sees no ambiguity in the statute.”); see also In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 884 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (striking petition of debtor who had not met counseling requirement).

[68]  Principal exclusions permit relief from the credit counseling requirement for debtors who reside in districts for which approved nonprofit budget and counseling agencies are not able to provide adequate services to accommodate all debtors needing such services; debtors with exigent circumstances that the court determines warrant a waiver of the counseling requirement; debtors who requested such services but were unable to obtain them during the five-day period beginning on the date of making the request; and debtors suffering from incapacity or disability or who are on active military duty in a military combat zone.  See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2006); In re Duplessis, No. 06-14747 (JNF), 2007 WL 118945 (Bankr. D. Mass. Jan. 11, 2007), *3 (rejecting debtor argument that failure to file evidence of receipt of pre-petition credit counseling was fault of credit counseling agency).

[69]  11 U.S.C. § 521(b)(1) (2006).

[70]  Id. § 521(b)(2).

[71]  See In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 504 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (struck petition of ineligible debtor, as debtor’s ineligibility meant that case could never have been commenced); In re Salazar, 339 B.R. 622, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (striking petition is appropriate remedy and operates as judicial recognition that bankruptcy case was never commenced and is void ab initio; hence, post-petition foreclosure did not violate automatic stay where debtors found to be ineligible for relief under BAPCPA); Adams v. Finlay, Nos. 06 Civ. 6039(CLB), 06-6040, 06-6041, 06-6042, 06-6075, 06-6077, 2006 WL 3240522 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006), *4 (same).  But cf. In re Falcone, 370 B.R. 462, 466-67 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (dismissed case of ineligible debtor, noting that this was majority position) (cases cited within); In re Brown, 342 B.R. 248, 253 (Bankr. D. Md. 2006) (dismissal was appropriate response to ineligibility, rather than “striking” petition to render it void from the outset; debtor’s ineligibility not ascertained until a court ruling, hence foreclosure sale violated automatic stay; finding Salazar “unpersuasive”).

[72]  In re Lomagno, 320 B.R. 473, 482 (B.A.P.), aff’d, 429 F.3d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2005) (reinstatement of dismissed case did not operate to retroactively reinstate automatic stay; foreclosure sale conducted post-dismissal was valid sale).

[73]  11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2006).

[74]  See In re Curry, 362 B.R. 394 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that automatic stay terminates in its entirety, including property of estate, while noting that this is minority view).  But see In re Holcomb, 380 B.R. 813 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (holding that automatic stay terminates only with regard to debtor, noting that this is majority view); In re Stanford, 373 B.R. 890 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2007) (same).

[75]  See In re Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2006) (reversing Massachusetts bankruptcy court to hold that Code § 362(c)(3) is unambiguous and stay does not terminate as to property of bankruptcy estate).

[76]  11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) (2006).

[77]  See In re Kurtzahn, 337 B.R. 356 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006) (chapter 13 debtor whose previous chapter 13 case had been dismissed less than one year earlier due to failure to make payments required under the plan failed to rebut strong statutory presumption that current case was not filed in good faith; motion requesting extension of temporary 30-day stay denied); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) (2006).

[78]  11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C) (2006).

[79]  Id. § 362(c)(3).

[80]  Id. § 362(d)(4).

[81]  Id. § 362.

[82]  Id.

[83]  Id.

[84]  Id. §§ 362(d)(4), 362(b)(20).

[85]  11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2000) (amended 2005).

[86]  11 U.S.C. § 101 (51B) (2006).

[87]  See In re Bennet, No. 06-80241, 2006 WL 1540842 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. May 26, 2006) (where mortgage lender and debtors sought court approval of reaffirmation agreement, court found that debtors were current on mortgage payments at the time of bankruptcy filing and remained current during pendency of the case; noted that Congress specifically limited “ride-through” option to “personal property” in BAPCPA; and accordingly refused to approve reaffirmation, holding that debtors have right to retain real property without being required to reaffirm or redeem if they are current on the obligation).  But cf. BankBoston v. Burr (In re Burr), 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998) (construing pre-BAPCPA Code § 521 to preclude ride-through option).

[88]  11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (2006) terminates the stay as to “personal property" of the estate when the debtor does not state or perform an intention to reaffirm or redeem.  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2006) refers to the debtor not retaining “personal property" without redeeming or reaffirming.
[89]  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006) (broadly refers to “debts which are secured by property of the estate…”).

[90]  Tremont Tower Condo. LLC v. George B.H. Macomber Co., 436 Mass. 677, 679 (2002). See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 2 (2006).

[91]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254 § 2 (2006).

[92]  Tremont Tower, 436 Mass. at 679 (quoting Hammill-McCormick. Assocs., Inc v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 399 Mass. 541, 542-43 (1987)).

[93]  Golden v. Gen. Builders Supply L.L.C., 441 Mass. 652, 654 (2004); Nat’l Lumber Co. v. LeFrancois Constr. Corp., 430 Mass. 663, 666 (2000), superseded on other grounds by  Nat’l Lumber Co. v. United Cas. & Sur. Ins. Co., 440 Mass. 723 (2004); see also Ng Bros. Constr. v. Cranney, 436 Mass. 638, 644 (2002) (mechanic’s lien statute is strictly construed against party claiming lien).

[94]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 2 (2006).

[95]  Id. § 2A.

[96]  Id. § 2.

[97]  Id.

[98]  Id.

[99]  Id.

[100]  Id. § 4.

[101]  Id. § 8.

[102]  Id.

[103]  Id.

[104]  Id. § 5.  The action may also be commenced in the district court in the judicial district where the land lies, but as a practical matter, the amount in controversy is likely to be large enough to warrant a superior court filing.

[105]  See id. §§ 5, 11.

[106]  Id.

[107] See, e.g., BloomSouth Flooring Corp. v. Boys’ & Girls’ Club of Taunton Inc., 440 Mass. 618, 620-24 (2003) (denying recovery to subcontractors, despite liens being filed within statutory deadlines, because there was no amount “due or to become due under the original contract” where subcontractors filed notices of contract after general contractor had abandoned project prior to substantial completion); Nat’l Lumber Co. v. Walsh, No. 0312-CV-0439, 2007 WL 1491105 (Mass. App. Div. May 21, 2007), *2-3 (following BloomSouth).

[108]  See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 15A (2006).

[109]  Id. § 10.

[110]  See id. § 15.  A certificate reflecting the judgment is sent by the clerk to the register of deeds and is filed and recorded in the registry as provided in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254 §§ 8-9 (2006).

[111]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 14 (2006).

[112]  Id.

[113]  Id.

[114]  Id.

[115]  Id.

[116]  Id.  Alternatively, an owner or other person may prevent the attachment of a lien by filing a bond at the outset of the project.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, § 12 (2006) provides, in pertinent part, that [a]ny person, including the owner, in interest in connection with a written contract covered by section two or section four may cause to be recorded in the registry of deeds in the county or district where the land lies a bond of a surety company authorized to do a surety business in Massachusetts and in a penal sum equal to the contract sum or, if the contract does not contain a contract sum, in a penal sum equal to that person's fair estimate of the contract sum, all as set forth in the certificate on the bond. … After the recording of any such bond no lien under this chapter shall thereafter attach in favor of any person entitled to the benefit of such bond and not named as a principal thereon for labor or for labor and materials performed under the contract in respect to which such bond is given.

[117] Richard E. Gentilli, Thomas M. Looney and Ward P. Graham, Mechanic’s lien may live on despite order dissolving it, 3 REBA News No. 3, at 4, as insert in Mass. Lawyer’s Weekly, Jul. 3, 2006.

[118]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, §§ 19-20, 22 (2006).

[119]  Id. §§ 19-20.

[120]  Id. § 22.

[121]  Id. § 21.

[122]  Id. § 32.

[123]  Id. § 7(a).

[124]  Id. § 32.

[125]  See supra Part I.C.

[126]  See In re 229 Main St., 262 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2001) (emphasis added) (automatic stay did not bar post-petition creation and perfection of environmental superlien); see also In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 152, 155 n.4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (compiling cases).

[127]  See In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 84 B.R. 289, 301 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (noting that mechanic’s liens are favored interests to be given retroactive effect pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254, §§ 1-33 (2006); compare 229 Main Street, 262 F.3d at 9, 10 (automatic stay did not bar post-petition creation and perfection of environmental superlien; reasoning that “generally applicable” law is any law that applies outside as well as in bankruptcy, and a lien is an “interest in property” that may be perfected pursuant to statute) (citing Fitch v. Jones & Lamson Mach. Co. (In re Jones & Lamson Mach. Co.), 113 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (permitting post-petition creation and perfection of mechanic’s lien where contractor’s work for debtor constituted its pre-petition interest in property)); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. at 155 n.4 (compiling cases).

[128]  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254 §§ 1-33 (2006).

[129]  Extrapolating from the reasoning in 229 Main Street, the filing of a post-petition notice of contract is arguably not barred by the automatic stay.  Chapter 254 - like chapter 21E - authorizes both the creation and perfection of a lien through the single act of a recording with the registry of deeds.   As the court of appeals observed, “statutory liens often are created and perfected by the same act.”  229 Main Street, 262 F.3d at 9.  While a contractor cannot obtain a mechanic’s lien without having filed a notice of contract, query whether it may nonetheless, by performance, acquire an “interest in property.”  If so, the concurrent creation and perfection of a mechanic’s lien may qualify as an “act to perfect” excepted from the stay by section 362(b)(3).  As the authors are unaware of any decisional law on point, however, they counsel practitioners not to exercise self-help in the form of a post-petition filing of a notice of contract.

[130]  As we have emphasized, a contractor acts at its own peril if it takes any action whatsoever to perfect or maintain or continue perfection of a lien without seeking relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court.  As a purely academic question, however, it is not clear whether a contractor that does not record a pre-petition notice of contract may have a basis for relief under § 362(b)(3).  Clearly such a contractor will not have a lien on the real property as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case.  See generally Tremont Tower Condo. LLC v. George B.H. Macomber Co., 436 Mass. 677 (2002).  The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, determined in 229 Main Street that an “interest in property” is, for purposes of § 362(b)(3), broader than a “lien.”  As the court observed, “statutory liens often are created and perfected by the same act,” and such creation and perfection may be excepted from the scope of the automatic stay where the claimant possesses a sufficient “interest in property” as of the commencement of the case.  229 Main Street, 262 F.3d at 9-10.  Thus, it is possible that the concurrent, post-petition creation and perfection under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 254 may be excepted from the stay by § 362(b)(3), but only if the contractor’s provision of labor and materials to the real property were viewed as creating an “interest in property,” albeit a lesser interest than a lien.  The authors have not located a Massachusetts case that has addressed this issue.

[131] See supra notes 48-53 for other relevant laws.

[132] Tremont Tower, 436 Mass. at 677.
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