By Rebecca G. Pontikes
Child-rearing, care-giving and
family responsibilities have traditionally been either marginalized
or devalued because they are "women's work." Women, who still
perform the lion's share of these responsibilities, pay a penalty
in the market workplace because employers reward only employees who
put all their time and effort into their jobs. Such an "ideal
worker" is assumed to have no family responsibilities or have a
partner who can take on those responsibilities. In other words, the
ideal worker is assumed to be a man with a wife who does not work
outside the home. Generally, employers are seen as entitled to the
"ideal worker." Any individuals who deviate from the norm are not
considered as desirable as the "ideal worker." In practical
reality, this is mostly women.
For women, the male construct of the
"ideal worker" forces them to make one of three choices: a) perform
two jobs (the marketplace job and a care-giving job), b) not enter
the workplace at all or leave it when after taking on care-giving
responsibilities, or c) work in a marginalized setting (for
example, part-time work). These three categories are a result of
the societal problem of sex discrimination that forces women into
traditional roles. However, in the popular imagination, when women
are forced into one of these three categories, it is called their
"choice."1 Thus, penalties from employers toward workers
with family responsibilities - particularly employing stereotypes
of how care-givers will or should act - have not traditionally been
viewed as actionable.
In truth, the "opt out revolution"
is anything but a freely made choice, and the three categories, as
well as the concept of an "ideal worker" who has no family
responsibilities, hurt men as well as women. The increasing number
of hours that workers spend at their jobs has led to a clash
between work and family responsibilities. The clash has spawned a
growth in the number of lawsuits filed by workers alleging they
were discriminated against because of their family care-giving
responsibilities. Called "family responsibility discrimination"
cases ("FRD"), the number of such cases has grown from a total of
eight in the 1970s, when the first case was heard in U.S. courts,
to 358 in the first half of the 2000s. Between 1996 and 2005, the
number of FRD cases filed grew nearly 400% from the previous
decade, from 97 cases to 481. The awards average a little more than
$100,000 with the largest award to date being $25 million.
Companies sued for discriminating against workers with family
responsibilities include nearly 30 that have been designated as
"Best Companies to Work For" by
The theme running through all FRD
claims is an employer who has stereotyped an employee because he or
she has family responsibilities and is no longer an "ideal worker."
The employer takes an adverse action based upon a stereotype of
what an ideal care-giver would, could, or should do. Practitioners
can bring FRD claims in both the federal and state courts through a
variety of statutes and common law theories:
Title VII
the Massachusetts Fair Employment
Practices Act
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA")
common law claims (breach of
contract, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
intentional interference with an advantageous relationship)
the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"), the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act ("MMLA"), and the
Small Necessities Leave Act ("SNLA")
the Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA") and
specific state statutes
Working Mother magazine or have been touted by Fortune's "Most
Admired" list as amongst the best in the nation for treating
employees well.2
Title VII and the
Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act, M.G.L. c.
151B
Employees who bring FRD
suits under Title VII and the Massachusetts Fair Employment
Practices Act, M.G.L. c. 151B can prove discrimination either
through comparator evidence or by demonstrating that the employer
acted based upon a stereotype of how a care-giver should or will
act. The stereotyping is move often evidenced through comments,
such as that it is not possible "to be a good mother and have this
job."3 Proof of stereotyping does not require
comparators, often making cases based upon such evidence easier to
prove than cases based upon comparators. Stereotyping about gender
was first deemed to be a violation of Title VII
in
In Massachusetts, the
Superior Court in
Employees can also rely
upon the "sex-plus" theory to show that their gender plus an
associated characteristic (childcare, pregnancy, etc.) was the
basis for the adverse employment action. In such cases,
the
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989). In Price Waterhouse, Hopkins, a female manager in an
accounting firm, was denied partnership after she failed to conform
to gender stereotypes. During the review process, "[o]ne partner
described her as 'macho;' another suggested that she
'overcompensated for being a woman;' [and] a third advised her to
take 'a course at charm school.'" Id. at 235. Hopkins was also
told that "in order to improve her chances for partnership … [she]
should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.'" Id. The idea was that penalizing a woman for not
conforming to a stereotype of how she should act constitutes gender
discrimination. In Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School
District, 365 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 2004), the Second
Circuit extended this logic to remarks about the incompatibility of
motherhood and employment. The Back court found that evidence that
stereotyping of women as caregivers can be evidence of sex
discrimination and that the employee did not need to put forth
comparator evidence to prove her case.Sivieri v. Department of
Transitional Assistance, 21 Mass.L.Rptr. 97, 2006 WL 1707954
(Mass.Super.) relied upon Price Waterhouse, Back, and a
case from the First Circuit, Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R.
Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000), to find that
"stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and
employment can be evidence of gender discrimination. These types of
statements reflect a discriminatory animus not towards parenthood,
but towards women, based upon antiquated ideas about what a woman's
role in society should be. Basing employment decisions on such
sex-based over-generalizations constitutes gender discrimination
prohibited by c. 151B." In response to the employer's argument that
Sivieri had no male comparators, the Court stated, "It would blink
reality to deny that a considerable part of our society believes
that mothers are principally responsible for the care of young
children and are therefore less effective as employees. Thus,
'where stereotypes are considered, the notions that mothers are
insufficiently devoted to work, and that work and motherhood are
incompatible, are properly considered to be, themselves,
gender-based'" (quoting Back).McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting paradigm is the method of proof, and the employee must
demonstrate that similarly situated individuals outside the
protected class were treated more favorably. The "sex-plus" theory
allows women to argue that treating men and some women without the
associated characteristic (for example, women without children)
more favorably is evidence of gender
discrimination.4
The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act
The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act ("PDA") bans treating pregnant women differently
from non-pregnant women and men who are similarly situated. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (k). However, case law has not limited the PDA to
pregnant women. Cases in which an employer refused to hire a
pregnant woman because it assumed that she would not return to work
immediately after the birth and in which an employer took adverse
actions against an employee who had been pregnant and who might
again become pregnant have also been upheld by the
courts.5
The FMLA , Massachusetts
Maternity Leave Act, and Small Necessities Leave
Act
The FMLA protects
caregivers in that employees are guaranteed up to twelve weeks
after the birth or adoption of a child to care for the child or to
care for a serious health condition of a spouse, child, or parent.
Employees also receive job protection for twelve weeks to care for
their own or a relative's serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. §§
2601
Under the FMLA, an
employee may sue for an employer's interference with his or her
attempt to exercise rights guaranteed by the statute and for
retaliation for having taken advantage of rights under the statute.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2615 (a) (1) and (2);
To assert a claim for
interference, the employee needs to show only that she or he was
entitled to take leave under the FMLA, the employer interfered with
the taking of the leave, and that she or he was harmed as a result.
There is no need to show that other, similarly situated employees
were treated differently or that the employer intended to interfere
with the employee's rights.9 Interference
includes:
a refusal to authorize
FMLA leave,
discouraging an employee
from using leave,
shortening the length of
leave to which the employee is entitled,
requesting that the
employee return to work earlier than required,
using the taking of FMLA
leave as a negative factor in employment actions,10
and
hostility following the
announcement that the employee intended to take FMLA
leave.11
et seq. Upon returning from the FMLA leave, the
employer must reinstate the employee to his or her former position
or to a comparable position with equivalent pay, benefits, and
terms and conditions of employment. 29 C.F.R. § 2614(a) (1); 29
C.F.R. § 825.214. If an employee's leave exceeds 12 weeks, she or
he loses the right to reinstatement.6 Two Massachusetts
state laws, the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act
("MMLA")7 and the Small Necessities Leave Act
("SNLA")8, provide similar protections for
employees.Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 301
(4th Cir. 1998).
The ADA's Association
Provision
The ADA bans
discrimination against workers who are associated with disabled
individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (4). The EEOC has opined that
"relationship or association" means a "family, business, social, or
other relationship or association." 29 CFR § 1630.8 (2006). In the
appendix to this part of the CFR, the EEOC specifically gives an
example of an employee with care-giving
responsibilities:
[A]ssume that a
qualified applicant without a disability applies for a job and
discloses to the employer that his or her spouse has a disability.
The employer thereupon declines to hire the applicant because the
employer believes that the applicant would have to miss work or
frequently leave work early in order to care for the spouse. Such a
refusal to hire would be prohibited by this
provision.
Appendix to 29 CFR §
1630.8.
To bring a cause of
action under this section, the employee must demonstrate that the
disabled individual with whom she or he is associated must meet the
definition of disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. 12102
(2);
Larimer v. IBM Corp., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7396,
2003 WL 1989649, 30 Employee Benefits Cas. 2189 (N.D. Ill., May 1,
2003); Jackson v. Service Engineering, Inc., 96 F.Supp. 2d 873
(S.D. Ind. 2000). The employee, however, is not entitled to an
accommodation because of the disabled individual with whom she or
he is associated.12
Common Law
Claims
Some plaintiffs have
been successful in bringing common law claims. In Massachusetts,
Dr. Tina Theroux brought sued her partners in a dental practice for
gender and pregnancy discrimination in violation of the
Massachusetts Equal Rights Act ("MERA") and breach of
contract.13 The Superior Court dismissed the MERA claim
but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. The Court
found that the defendants had invoked a provision of Theroux's
contract which deprived her of the benefit of her bargain based
upon her pregnancy, thus violating the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing implied in all contracts.
State
Statutes
Some states and
municipalities have enacted legislation which specifically protects
care-givers. Alaska, Connecticut, and Washington D.C. all have
statutes which protect either "parenthood" or "familial status" as
part of their employment anti-discrimination statutes. Aspen,
Colorado, Atlanta, Georgia, Cook County, Illinois, Crested Butte,
Colorado, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Howard County, Maryland,
Miami-Dade County, Florida, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, State College,
Pennsylvania, Tacoma, Washington, and Tampa, Florida all have
family responsibility, familial status, or parental status as part
of their employment anti-discrimination laws. Additionally, several
states have pending legislation to make discrimination based upon
familial status or care-giver status unlawful: California, Florida,
Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania. Practitioners who practice in
any of these forums can take advantage of a directly applicable law
rather than try to fit an FRD claim into other, pre-existing
frameworks.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, women who
work outside of the home are still saddled with both family
responsibilities and market work responsibilities. With employers
demanding more and more hours, it is little wonder that FRD claims
are on the rise. Practitioners who are interested in bringing these
claims have a wide variety of different vehicles to address FRD. By
properly spotting these issues, these claims will not be able to be
ignored and will spur changes in the workplace.
Additional
Resources
www.worklifelaw.org
www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (EEOC's
Care-Giver Discrimination Guidelines)
www.abetterbalance.org
www.pardc.org
www.flextimelawyers.com
www.mass.gov/mcad/maternity1.html (MCAD's Maternity
Leave Act Guidelines)
Unbending Gender: Why
Work and Family Conflict and What to Do About It
, by Joan C. Williams (Oxford University Press,
1999)
Solving the Part-Time
Puzzle: The Law Firm's Guide to Balanced Hours
WorkLife Law's Guide to
Family Responsibilities Discrimination, Joan C. Williams and
Cynthia Thomas Calvert, WorkLife Law, UC Hastings College of the
Law, 2006 (available at www.worklifelaw.org).
"A Crackdown on
Caregiver Discrimination," Carmelyn P. Malalis and Linda A.
Neilan,
"Litigating the Maternal
Wall: U.S. Lawsuits Charging Discrimination against Workers with
Family Responsibilities", by Mary Still, 2006 (available at
www.worklifelaw.org).
"Family Responsibilities
Discrimination: Don't Get Caught Off Guard," Joan C. Williams,
22
, by Joan C. Williams and Cynthia Thomas Calvert,
forthcoming (National Association for Law Placement)Trial
Magazine, August, 2007.The Labor Lawyer 293
(2007).
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4. Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
5. Wagner v. Dillard
Department Stores, Inc., 17 Fed. Appx. 141 (4th Cir.
2001); Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc., 332 F.3d 1150
(8th Cir. 2003).
6. See e.g., Myrick v.
Aramark Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7301,
7. M.G.L. c. 149,
§105D.
8. M.G.L. c. 149, §
52D.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612
(a) and 2614 (a); Callison v. City of Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117
(3rd Cir. May 19, 2005).
10. 29 CFR § 825.220
(b) (2006); Liu v. Amway Corporation, 347 F.3d 1125, 1134
(9th Cir. 2003) (supervisor's pressuring employee to
reduce her leave, changing her status from "pregnancy leave" to
"personal leave," issuing a negative performance evaluation while
the employee was on leave, and supervisor's hostile attitude
towards the employee was enough evidence to preclude summary
judgment for the employer).
11. Batka v. Prime
Charter, Ltd, 301 F.Supp.2d 308, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Other
examples of FMLA claims for FRD are:
Van Diest v. Deloitte
& Touche, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22106, 2005 WL 2416921 (N.D.
Ohio 2005). The court upheld an FMLA retaliation claim filed by a
receptionist after she took FMLA leave to care for her sick mother.
The court reasoned that she was terminated one month after
requesting FMLA leave and had always received good evaluations
prior to her termination.
Lincoln v. Sears Home
Improvement Products, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 402, 2004 WL
62716 (D. Minn. 2004). The court rejected the employer's argument
that the plaintiff was fired because he failed to return the FMLA
paperwork when he took leave to care for his mother who suffered
from depression after his father's death. The court reasoned that
the plaintiff gave the employer sufficient notice and that the
employer failed to provide him with notice of his FMLA rights when
his father was ill and denied plaintiff's leave requests during
both his mother's and father's illness.
Knussman v. State of
Maryland, 65 F. Supp.2d 353 (D.Md. 1999). The Fourth Circuit upheld
an award of $665,000 in damages, attorney's fees, and costs to a
father who sued under FMLA after his employer refused to grant his
request for leave to care for his newborn child.
12. Regulations to
Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 29 5CFR Pt. 1630, App. section 1630.8
(2005).
Some examples of ADA
Association cases include:
13.
Unbending Gender: Why Work and Family Conflict and
What to Do About It, by Joan C. Williams (Oxford University Press,
1999).Litigating the Maternal Wall: U.S. Lawsuits Charging
Discrimination against Workers with Family Responsibilities, by
Mary Still, University of California Hastings College of the Law,
July 6, 2006. This paper is available in .pdf format at
www.worklifelaw.org. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
School District, 365 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 2004). 2004 WL
906176, (N.D. Ill. 2004).
Sallis v. Prime Acceptance Corp.
, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16693, 2005 WL 1950661 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
The court denied summary judgment in FMLA claim filed by employee
who claimed that after requesting and obtaining approval to care
for her mother, who had emphysema, the employer began changing her
job duties, gave her written warnings threatening to terminate her
if she took more time off from work, assigned her more difficult
accounts, and terminated her.
Wagner v. Dillard Department
Stores
, 2001 WL 967495 (4th Cir. 2001). District Court's
finding of discrimination upheld in a case involving a pregnant
woman who was not hired because her potential employer feared she
would take family leave.
Fisher v. Rizzo Brothers
Painting Contractors, Inc.
, 403 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D. Ky. 2005). The employer told a
pregnant employee that in fifty-four years, the company had never
had a pregnant employee, that her pregnancy was viewed as an
"inconvenience" by her co-workers, and that she would not want to
return to work after the birth. The employee suffered from
complications to her pregnancy and required leave. The employer
told the employee that any leave would be unpaid and did not advise
her of her rights under the FMLA. The employee asked to be "laid
off" to collect unemployment. When she contacted her employer to be
re-hired, she was told that there was no position for her. She sued
claiming interference with her use of FMLA rights. The Court denied
summary judgment finding a question of fact as to whether the
employee would have returned from leave.
McGrenaghan v. St. Denis
School
, 979 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The court held that an
employer violated the ADA's association clause when it transferred
a teacher with a full-time position to a half-day teaching,
half-day resources and position shortly after her son was born with
a disability.
Abdel-Khalek v. Ernst &
Young, LLP
, 1999 WL 190790 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 1999, as amended April 7,
1999). The court upheld plaintiff's ADA claim that she was not
hired because her daughter had serious health problems, reasoning
that (1) the defendant knew the plaintiff's daughter had a
disability and (2) the plaintiff was the only member of the
technical staff not hired when the defendant acquired her former
employer.
Miller v. CBC
, 908 F. Supp. 1054 (D.N.H. 1995). The court upheld an ADA
claim filed by a female manager who said the her employer told her
she should stay home with her kids (twins and a son with Down
Syndrome) and that having a son with a disability made her
unpromotable.
Gower v. Wrenn Handling,
Inc.
, 892 F. Supp. 724 (M.D.N.C. 1995). Denying summary judgment on
ADA association claim because high medical bills for several
surgeries related to plaintiff's son's eye disorder may have been a
factor leading to plaintiff's termination.
Deghand v. Walmart Stores,
Inc.
, 926 F.Supp. 1002 (D. Kans. 1996). The court denied employer's
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that (1) most of relevant
adverse employment action occurred soon after plaintiff's husband's
mental breakdown; (2) plaintiff's supervisors told her that her
husband's condition caused her too much stress, and (3) plaintiff's
supervisors told her that the employees she supervised were
uncomfortable with her because of her husband's disability.
Tyndall v. National Education
Centers,
31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's rejection of ADA association claim, reasoning that
the plaintiff's termination resulted from her record of past
absences and need for additional time off and not the employer's
assumption that she would have to miss work to care for her
disabled son.Theroux v. Singer et al, 21 Mass.L.Rptr. 187, 2006
WL 1745788 (Mass.Super.).